Obama needs to learn from Karzai
M.K. Bhadrakumar
On the Afghan political theatre, without the opprobrium of western company, Hamid Karzai’s profile got a facelift.
In retrospect, U.S. President Barack Obama did a favour to Afghan President Hamid Karzai by excluding him from his charmed circle of movers and shakers who would wield clout with the new administration in Washington. Mr. Obama did not even converse with Mr. Karzai telephonically since he was sworn in U.S. President, though Afghanistan was the number one foreign policy priority of his presidency.
On the other hand, he deputed Vice-President Joseph Biden to Kabul to let it be known to Mr. Karzai that unless he governed better, the U.S. would rather seek a regime change. The Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Jaap de Hoop Schaffer, publicly chastised Mr. Karzai as if the Afghan leader was a mere vassal of the western alliance. It was an appalling breach of protocol as Mr. Schaffer, a one-time foreign minister himself, would know.
But Mr. Karzai has had the last laugh as he travelled to Washington from Kabul for an “intense” trilateral summit meeting with Mr. Obama and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on Thursday. Mr. Schaffer, Mr. Biden, and Mr. Obama — indeed, they all have something to ponder over this week. Clearly, Mr. Karzai is far from walking into the sunset. He seems poised to win the Afghan presidential election on August 20.
The supreme irony is that what probably helped Mr. Karzai more than anything else to successfully wrap up his re-election bid is that western politicians rubbished him and distanced themselves ostentatiously from him. On the Afghan political theatre, without the opprobrium of western company, Mr. Karzai’s profile got a facelift. He began gaining in credibility.
On Monday, Mr. Karzai formally registered his candidacy for the presidential election. The last date of filing nominations ends by the weekend. No gladiator has appeared to challenge him. His vice-presidential running mates will be two stalwarts of the erstwhile anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, Muhammad Fahim Qasim from Panjshir and Muhammad Karim Khalili from Hazarajat. It is no doubt a dream-ticket. Mr. Fahim brings in Tajik support in good measure, while Mr. Khalili is the unquestioned leader of the Hazara Shi’ites in Bamyan. Mr. Karzai himself, of course, is the proud scion of a powerful Pashtun tribe. Conceivably, the Karzai-Fahim-Khalili ticket may enjoy a back-to-back understanding with Uzbek strongman Abdul Rashid Dostum and Hazara commander Mohammad Mohaqiq from the Amu Darya region in northern Afghanistan.
Mr. Karzai’s ticket has several engrossing features. It is of course multi-ethnic, multicultural and inter-regional. Second, it has the potential to rally the Mujahideen. Both Mr. Fahim and Mr. Khalili were notable Mujahideen leaders. They have extensive networking with the Mujahideen leaders — including with ideologically disparate figures like Rasul Sayyaf or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — who still form a significant constituency.
Third, their role in the anti- Taliban resistance is too well-known to be reiterated. Their presence in the top echelons of the power structure will underscore the imperative of an inclusive, broad-based government as part of any settlement with the Taliban. Fourth, Mr. Fahim and Mr. Khalili are truly “sons of the soil”. They may lack Karzai’s sartorial skill, English fluency, urbaneness and panache for diplomacy, but they stuck it out through the 30-year civil war. Also, they bring in something that Mr. Karzai himself lacks. They are both experienced commanders with sizeable followings and can significantly contribute to the “Afghanisation” of the war. Mr. Fahim also headed the intelligence wing of the Northern Shura under Ahmed Shah Massoud.
Besides, Mr. Karzai has in Mr. Fahim a running mate who is known to the Russians and in Mr. Khalili an “Ustad” who enjoyed the respect and backing of the Iranians. With Mr. Fahim and Mr. Khalili coming on board, Mr. Karzai has virtually ensured that there cannot be any unified opposition arrayed against his candidacy.
Mr. Karzai’s success offers some salutary lessons about Afghan politics. In essence, he spent the past few weeks in backroom negotiations — Afghan style — cutting deals with onetime adversaries, manoeuvring through minefields, reconciling contradictions, and compromising or bartering influence and power with political bosses. The high point was reached on Saturday when Gul Agha Sherzai, the popular governor of Nangarhar, who was expected to announce his candidacy this week, dropped by to meet Mr. Karzai in the presidential palace in Kabul.
The two Pashtun leaders were closeted for over four hours after which Mr. Sherzai emerged with a gem of a statement. He said: “I visited the president, and hugged his little son and decided to withdraw my candidacy. I will neither lead this [opposition] alliance nor announce my candidacy for the presidential election.”
Mr. Sherzai wouldn’t say more about his sudden change of heart. Instead, in a flamboyant show of indifference to all power, Mr. Sherzai said he would also resign as governor. Whereupon, the presidential spokesman in Kabul came up with a response that “The president of Afghanistan appreciated Gul Agha Sherzai’s announcement he will not run in the presidential election, and called it a positive step towards improving the government and unity of the people of Afghanistan”.
He added, “Hamid Karzai sees Gul Agha Sherzai as a very fine and hardworking governor and a good adviser, and rejects his resignation.” The political tremor ensuing from Mr. Sherzai’s change of heart will force a rethink on the other potential contenders in the election on August 20, who include Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan who is popularly seen by Afghans as the “American candidate”, Ashraf Ghani, yet another U.S.-based contender who was also a former finance minister, Ali Jalali, former interior minister and Abdullah Abdullah, former foreign minister who used to be Massoud’s aide.
It doesn’t take much ingenuity to comprehend that with Mr. Sherzai’s reconciliation, Mr. Karzai has brought into his candidacy an axis of two powerful Pashtun tribes from the Kandahar and Nangarhar regions, the heartland of Pashtun nationalism.
The Afghan experience with democracy offers a good lesson for Mr. Obama: it is best to leave the Afghans to broker power-sharing on their own terms according to their own ethos and traditions. Be a facilitator if you wish, but never a dictator. Conceivably, unlike in 2001 when Mr. Karzai appeared as the U.S.’s choice, or in 2004 when the U.S. choreographed his election, this time around, if he indeed manages to win a mandate through his own efforts, he will enjoy a degree of legitimacy that Mr. Obama could never hope to confer on him. Arguably, Mr. Karzai is set to graduate to the league of Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
True, as Mr. Biden took leave of Kabul, he left behind a widespread impression in the Afghan bazaar that divested of Washington’s political support, Mr. Karzai’s days were numbered. Mr. Karzai has since made an extraordinary recovery in his standing. If a marker is to be put on the reversal of Mr. Karzai’s political fortunes, it could be dated January 20 when Mr. Obama ignored Mr. Karzai and instead invited four other Afghan politicians to attend his inaugural in Washington.
Curiously, those four Afghans included Mr. Sherzai and Mr. Abdullah who since figured as presidential hopefuls until last Saturday when Mr. Sherzai — the formerly drug-tainted warlord who resembles a rotund, feudal king and impressed with Mr. Obama, who once enjoyed a close relationship with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence — travelled to Kabul, hugged Mr. Karzai’s two-year old son and decided it was simply not worth his while to contest an election against the little boy’s father.
Peering through the looking glass, what lies ahead? In the event of Mr. Karzai winning a fresh term as President, which is almost certain by now, all sorts of possibilities open up on the political track as the Obama administration searches for an exit strategy. Clearly, Mr. Karzai has emerged as a factor on the chessboard whom the U.S. cannot take for granted. On the one hand, Mr. Karzai has lined up the Northern Alliance with him as well as the erstwhile Mujahideen. On the other hand, in Mr. Sherzai, he has an ally who seeks the empowerment of tribes — making deals with tribal leaders is central to his political programme — and negotiation with the Taliban, who is, therefore, broadly in sync with Mr. Obama’s thinking. No doubt, Mr. Sherzai knows the insurgent enemy well. Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar disappeared from Kandahar in the chaotic days of October 2001 following a deal involving transfer of power to Mr. Sherzai.
In a March interview, Mr. Sherzai said, “I will approach all the tribal leaders to negotiate with the Taliban who have been brain-washed by other people. I won’t rely on fighting and destruction and air strikes. There are a lot of other ways to approach this other than fighting… Afghanistan is a tribal society and we can solve all the problems through jirgas [traditional tribal councils]. I will tell all of the people who are tired of fighting, to bring their Talibs to me and I will negotiate